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Policy interest in export diversification derives largely from the notion that 
poor countries are excessively reliant on primary commodities in their 
export and output structures and that they should diversify into activities 
characterized by technology spillovers and high productivity growth. 
However, this notion largely rests on the early conjecture of Prebisch (1950) 
and, more recently, on reduced-form econometrics that has become highly 
controversial. 
Academic interest in export diversification is not new, going back at least to 
Michaely’s work (Michaely 1958). It got a new boost under several 
impulses. First, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) uncovered a curious pattern of 
diversification and re-concentration in production, prompting researchers 
to explore whether the same was true of trade. Second, so-called “new-new” 
trade models (featuring firm heterogeneity) suggest complex relationships 
between trade diversification and productivity, with causation running one 
way at the firm level and the other way around (or both ways) at the 
aggregate level. Third, a wave of recent empirical work has questioned 
traditional views on the “natural-resource curse”, challenging the notion 
that diversification out of primary resources is a prerequisite for growth. 
Finally, yet another strand of literature has uncovered significant 
productivity gains related to the decision of importing inputs at the firm 
level, confirming the intuition of “love-of-variety” models. Thus, our current 
understanding of the trade diversification/ productivity/growth nexus 
draws on several theoretical and empirical literatures, all well developed 
and growing rapidly. It is easy to get lost in the issues, and the present 
paper’s objective is to sort them out and take stock of elements of answers 
to the basic questions.   
Among those questions, the firsts are simply factual ones—how export 
diversification is measured and what are the basic stylized facts about trade 
export diversification, across time and countries, which we explore in 
Section 2 and 3 respectively. The third one is about diversification’s drivers, 
and is tackled in Section 4. In Section 5, we turn to the relationship between 
diversification and growth. In Section 6, focuses on the import side; we 
review the evidence on import diversification and productivity and extend 
the discussion to labor-market issues. Finally, in Section 7, we consider 
some policy implications and conclusions. 
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2.   Measuring diversification 
2.1  Overall indices 
Although much of the talk is about trade diversification, quantitative 
measures, most of them borrowed from the income-distribution literature, 
are about concentration. We will review these measures taking the example 
of export diversification (which has anyway been the focus of most papers) 
keeping in mind that they apply equally well to imports. All concentration 
indices basically measure inequality between export shares; these shares, in 
turn, can be defined at any level of aggregation. Of course, the finer the 
disaggregation, the better the measure.  
The most frequently used concentration indices are the ones used in the 
income-distribution literature: Herfindahl, Gini, and Theil. All three can be 
easily programmed but are also available as packages in Stata. For a given 
country and year (but omitting country and time subscripts), the 
Herfindahl index of export concentration, normalized to range between 
zero and one, is given by the following formula: 







           
where sk = xk / xk
k=1
n
∑ is the share of export line k (with amount exported xk) 
in total exports and n is the number of export lines.  
As for the Gini index, several equivalent definitions have been used in the 
literature, among which one of the simplest can be calculated by first 
ordering export items (at the appropriate level of aggregation) by increasing 
size (or share) and calculating cumulative export shares Xk = sl
l=1
k
∑ . The 
Gini coefficient is then 
  G =1− (Xk − Xk−1)/ n
k=1
n
∑ .       
Finally, Theil’s entropy index (Theil 1972) is given by    
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Theil’s index has the property that it can be calculated for groups of 
individuals (export lines) and decomposed additively into within-groups 
and between-groups components (that is, the within- and between-groups 
components add up to the overall index). Specifically, Let n be the notional 
number of export products (the 5’016 lines of the HS6 nomenclature), 
 
nj 
the number of export lines in group j, µ the average dollar export value, 
 
µ j  
group j’s average dollar export value, and  xk  the dollar value of export line 
k. The  between-groups component is 
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  (1) 
and the within-groups component is  
 









































       
  (2) 
where T
j  stands for Theil’s sub-index for group j = 0,1. It is easily verified 
that  T
W +T
B = T . We will see in the next section a useful application of 
this property in our context. 
2.2 Intensive and extensive margins 
Export concentration measured at the intensive margin reflects inequality 
between the shares of active export lines. Conversely, diversification at the 
intensive margin during a period t0  to t1means convergence in export 
shares among goods that were exported at t0 . Concentration at the 
extensive margin is a subtler concept. At the simplest, it can be taken to 
mean a small number of active export lines. Then, diversification at the 
extensive margin means a rising number of active export lines. This is a 
widely used notion of the extensive margin (in differential form), and the 
decomposition of Theil’s index can be usefully mapped into the intensive 
and extensive margins thus defined. Suppose that, for a given country and 
year, we partition the 5’000 or so lines making up the HS6 nomenclature 
into two groups: group one is made of active export lines for this country 
and year, and group “zero” is made of inactive export lines. We could CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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potentially use this partition to construct group Theil sub-indices, one for 
each group i = 0,1, and their within and between components. However, 
note that the between-groups sub-index is not defined since µ0 = 0 and 
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 so, based on our partition  
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  (4) 
As 
   
µ1 = 1/ n1 ( ) xk k∈G1 ∑ , 
   
µ = 1/ n ( ) xk k ∑  and, by construction, 
   
xk k∈G1 ∑ = xk k ∑ , it follows that  
 








  .          
  (5)  
and, as n is fixed,  
 
   
limµ0→0 ∆T
B = ∆n1  (6) 
where ∆ denote a period-to-period change. That is, given our partition, the 
between-groups component measures changes at the extensive margin.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
 
6 
As for the “within-groups” component, it is a weighted average of terms 
combining group-specific means and group-specific Theil indices  T
j. In 
group    G0  (inactive lines), again    µ0 = T
0 = 0; so, in our case,  T
W  reduces to 
   T
1, the group Theil index for active lines. Thus, given our partition, changes 
in the within-groups Theil index measure changes at the intensive margin. 
In sum, Theil’s decomposition makes it possible to decompose changes in 
overall concentration into extensive-margin and intensive-margin changes. 
1 
However, the extensive margin defined this way (by simply counting the 
number of active export lines) leaves out important information. To see 
why, observe that a country can raise its number of active export lines in 
many different ways. For instance, it could add “embroidery in the piece, in 
strips or in motifs” (HS 5810); or, it could add “compression-ignition 
internal combustion piston engines (HS 8408, i.e. diesel engines). Clearly, 
these two items are not of the same significance economically, although a 
mere count of active lines would treat them alike. Hummels and Klenow 
(2005) proposed an alternative definition of the intensive and extensive 
margins that takes this information into account. Formally, let xk
i  be the 
value of country i’s exports of good k and xk
W  the world’s exports of that 
good; let also G1
i stand for the group of country i’s active export lines. 











;  (7) 
that is, country i’s intensive margin is its market share in what it exports. 
The extensive margin is similarly defined as 
                                                        
 
 
1 This mapping between the Theil decomposition and the margins was first 













;  (8) 
that is, it tells how much the goods which i exports count in world trade. 
2.3 The other margins 
Brenton and Newfarmer (2007) proposed an alternative definition of the 
extensive margin based on bilateral flows. The index measures how many of 
destination market j’s imports are covered (completely or partly—the index 
does not use information on the value of trade flows) by exports from i.  
Formally, let again G1
i be the set of goods exported by country i to any 
destination, G1
ij  be the set of goods exported by i to destination country j, 
and M1
j  the set of goods imported by destination country j from any origin. 
Based on these groups, define binary variables 
  gk
ij =


















  (10) 
Brenton and Newfarmer’s index for country i is then 









.  (11) 
The numerator is the number of products that i exports to j, while the 
denominator is the number of products that j imports from somewhere and 
that i exports to somewhere. It is expressed in (11) as the subset, among i’s 
exports, of goods that are imported by j from any source. It is thus the sum 
of actual and potential bilateral trade flows (for which there is a demand in j 
and a supply in i), and the fraction indicates how many of those potential 
trade flows take place actually.  
Finally, yet another non-traditional margin of export expansion is the 
survival of trade flows, analyzed for the first time in Besedes and Prusa’s 
seminal work. The length of time during which bilateral exports of a given CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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good take place without interruption is a dimension along which exports 
vary and which may also be a margin for export promotion. We will 
however leave the export-survival margin outside of the present review. 
3. Putting the measures at work 
3.1 Overall evolution 
Although one might expect that diversification of economic activities rises 
monotonically with income, Imbs and Wacziarg’s seminal work (Imbs and 
Wacziarg 2003) showed that this is not the case. Past a certain level of 
income ($9’000 in 1985 PPP dollars), countries re-concentrate their 
production structure, whether measured by employment or value added. 
Using different data, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) confirmed the existence of 
a U-shaped relationship between the concentration of production and the 
level of development. 
Since then, a number of papers have looked at whether a similar non-
monotone pattern holds for trade. Looking at trade made it possible to 
reformulate the question at a much higher degree of disaggregation since 
trade data is available for the 5’000 or so lines of the six-digit harmonized 
system (henceforth HS6). In terms of concentration levels, exports are 
typically much more concentrated than production. This concentration, 
which was observed initially by Hausmann and Rodrik (2006), is 
documented in detail for manufacturing exports in Easterly, Reshef and 
Schwenkenberg (2009). A striking (but not unique) example of this 
concentration is the case of Egypt which, “[out] of 2’985 possible 
manufacturing products in [the] dataset and 217 possible destinations, […] 
gets 23 percent of its total manufacturing exports from exporting one 
product—“ceramic bathroom kitchen sanitary items not percelain”—to one 
destination, Italy, capturing 94 percent of the Italian import market for that 
product.” (p. 3) These “big hits”, as they call them, account for a substantial 
part of the cross-country variation in export volumes. But they also 
document that the distribution of values at the export × destination level CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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(their unit of analysis) closely follows a power law; that is, the probability of 
a big hit decreases exponentially with its size.  
In terms of evolution, Klinger and Lederman (2006) used a panel of 73 
countries over 1992-2003, while Cadot et al. (2009) used a larger one with 
156 countries representing all regions and all levels of development between 
1988 and 2006. In both cases, and in Parteka (2007) as well, concentration 
measures obtained with trade data turned out to be much higher than those 
obtained with production and employment data.2 But the U-shaped pattern 
showed up again, albeit with a turning point at much higher income levels 
($22,500 in constant 2000 PPP dollars for Klinger and Lederman, and 
$25,000 in constant 2005 PPP dollars for Cadot et al.). Note that, as the 
turning point occurs quite late, the level of export concentration of the 
richest countries in the sample is much lower than that of the poorest. 
3.2  Which margin matters? 
Decompositions of the growth of exports into intensive- and extensive-
margin growth have typically shown that the latter dominates by far. The 
pioneer work of Evenett and Venables (2002) used 3-digit trade data for 23 
exporters over 1970-1997 and found that about 60% of total export growth 
is at the intensive margin, i.e. comes from larger exports of products traded 
since 1970 to long-standing trading partners. Brenton and Newfarmer 
                                                        
 
 
2 The reason has to do with the level of disaggregation rather than with any 
conceptual difference between trade, production and employment shares. Whereas 
Imbs and Wacziarg calculated their indices at a relatively high degree of 
aggregation (ILO 1 digit, UNIDO 3 digits and OECD 2 digits), Cadot et al. (2009) 
uses very disaggregated trade nomenclature. At that level there is a large number of 
product lines with small trade values, while a relatively limited number of them 
account for the bulk of all countries’ trade (especially so of course for developing 
countries but even for industrial ones). The reason for this pattern is that the 
harmonized system used by COMTRADE is derived from nomenclatures originally 
designed for tariff-collection purposes rather than to generate meaningful 
economic statistics. Thus, it has a large number of economically irrelevant 
categories e.g. in the textile-clothing sector while economically important 
categories in machinery, vehicles, computer equipment etc. are lumped together in 
“mammoth” lines. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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(2007), using SITC data at the 5 digit-level over 99 countries and 20 years, 
found that intensive-margin growth accounts for the biggest part of trade 
growth (80.4%). Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola (2008) found that extensive-
margin growth accounts for only 14% of export at the HS6 level for a panel 
of 24 countries over 1990-2005. Thus, in spite of the attention it has 
received in the literature, the extensive margin accounts for only 14% to 
40% of trade growth.  
Although not predominant quantitatively as a driver of export growth, the 
extensive margin can react strongly to changes in trade costs, an issue we 
will revisit later on in this survey. For instance, Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) 
found that the set of least traded goods, which accounted for only 10% of 
trade before trade liberalization, may grow to account for 30% of trade or 
more after liberalization. Activity at the extensive margin also varies a lot 
along the economic development process. Klinger and Lederman (2006) 
and Cadot et al. (2009) show that the number of new exports falls rapidly as 
countries develop, after peaking at lower-middle income level. The poorest 
countries, which have the greatest scope for new-product introduction 
because of their very undiversified trade structures, unsurprisingly have the 
strongest extensive-margin activity.3 
                                                        
 
 
3 The average number of active export lines is generally low at a sample average of 
2’062 per country per year (using Cadot et al.‘s sample), i.e. a little less than half 
the total, with a minimum of 8 for Kiribati in 1993  and a maximum of 4’988 for 
Germany in 1994 and the United States in 1995.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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Figure 1 depicts the contribution of the between-groups and within-groups 
components to Theil’s overall index, using the formulae derived in the 
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Source: Cadot et al. 2009. 
It can be seen that the within component dominates the index while the 
between component accounts for most of the evolution. Put differently, 
most of the concentration in levels occurs at the intensive margin (in goods 
that are long-standing exports) while changes in concentration are at the 
extensive margin (for example the decreased concentration for lower 
income countries results mainly from a rise in the number of exported 
goods). 
As discussed in the previous section, the extensive margin in 
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Figure 1 is measured only by the number of exports, not their economic 
importance. Correcting for the economic importance of the products 
introduced calls for Hummels and Klenow’s decomposition. Using 
UNCTAD trade data at the HS6 level (5,017 product lines) for 1995, 
Hummels and Klenow (2005) performed a cross-sectional analysis of 
exports for 126 countries in decomposing exports into extensive and 
intensive margins. Interestingly, they found that 38% of the higher trade of 
larger economies to typical markets is explained by the intensive margin 
while 62% occurs for the extensive margin. That is, once the extensive 
margin is corrected for the importance of the new exports introduced, the 
previous result (the relative unimportance of the extensive margin) is 
reversed. 
Digging deeper into the specificities of the extensive margin along the lines 
discussed in the previous section, several studies have disentangled its 
product and geographic components. Evenett and Venables (2002) found 
that, on average 10% of total export growth can be accounted by the 
introduction of new products and about one third by sales of long standing 
exportables to new trading partners. Hummels and Klenow (2005) 
mentioned that countries export on average to fewer than 13% of the 
countries that actually import the good. This idea was developed by Brenton 
and Newfarmer (2007) using the index described in the previous section. 
They showed that growth at the extensive margin (20% of total exports 
growth) was mostly driven by geographic diversification (18% of total 
export growth). Their work incidentally showed that the poorest countries 
do less well in exploiting the available markets for the goods they produce, 
as variation in their index across income levels is much larger than 
variation in traditional extensive-margin indices.  
 
4. Drivers of diversification 
4.1 Diversification and productivity: chicken or 
egg? 
Traditional trade theory has little insight to offer on the potential 
determinants of export diversification beyond the observation that, in 
Ricardian models, causation runs from productivity to trade patterns and 
not the other way around. Recent developments from “new-new trade 
theory” give a bit more insight. In the specification proposed by Melitz 
(2003) firms are heterogeneous in productivity levels, and only a subset of 
them—the most productive—become exporters. Thus, exporting status and 
productivity are correlated at the firm level. However, causation runs only CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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one way, like in Ricardian models, as productivity is distributed across 
firms as an i.i.d. random variable and is not affected by the decision to 
export, be it through learning or any other mechanism. At the firm level, the 
correlation between exporting status and productivity, in Melitz’s model, 
comes only from a selection effect.  
At the aggregate level, however, causation can run either way in a Melitz 
model, depending on the nature of the shock. To see this, suppose first that 
the initial shock is a decrease in trade costs. Melitz’s model and recent 
variants of it (e.g. Chaney 2008, Feenstra and Lee 2008) show that more 
firms will export, which will raise export diversification since in a 
monopolistic-competition model each firm sells a different variety. But low-
productivity ones will exit the market altogether, pushing up aggregate 
industry productivity—albeit, again, by a selection effect. In this case, trade 
drives aggregate productivity.  
Suppose now that the shock is an exogenous—say, technology-driven—
increase in firm productivity across the board, i.e. affecting equally all firms 
and all sectors. Think of a multi-sector heterogeneous-firm model à la 
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) in which the distribution of firm-level 
productivities is Pareto in all sectors but differs in Melitz’s  % ϕ  (and only in 
it). Ordering sectors by increasing value of  % ϕ , for a given trade cost there 
will be a cutoff  % ϕ0 such that sectors with  0
~ ~ ϕ ϕ > have an upper tail of firms 
that are productive enough to export (comparative-advantage sectors), and 
sectors with  0
~ ~ ϕ ϕ ≤ don’t (comparative disadvantage sectors). Ceteris 
paribus, the productivity shock will raise the number of sectors with 
0
~ ~ ϕ ϕ > , and thus the number of active export lines. In this case, 
productivity will drive trade. 
The pre-Melitz empirical literature on the productivity-export linkage at the 
firm level was predicated on the idea that firms learn by exporting (see e.g. 
Haddad 1993, Aw and Hwang 1995, Tybout and Westbrook). However, 
Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) argued theoretically that the productivity 
differential between exporting and non-exporting firms was a selection 
effect, not a learning one, and found support for this interpretation using 
plant-level data in Columbia, Mexico and Morocco. Subsequent studies 
(Bernard and Jensen 1999; Eaton et al. 2004, 2007; Helpman et al. 2004; 
Demidova 2006) confirmed the importance of selection effects at the firm 
level. The most recent literature extends the source of heterogeneity to 
characteristics other than just productivity; for instance, several recent 
papers consider the ability to deliver quality (Johnson 2008, Verhoogen 
2008, or Kugler and Verhoogen 2008). Hallak and Sivadasan (2008) 
combine the two in a model with multidimensional heterogeneity where CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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firms differ both in their productivity and in their ability to deliver quality. 
They find, in conformity with their model, that the empirical firm-level 
determinants of export performance are more complex than just the level of 
productivity. 
At the aggregate level, most of the literature so far has put export 
diversification on the left-hand side of the equation and income on the 
right-hand side. As we already saw, Klinger and Lederman (2006), Parteka 
(2007) and Cadot et al. (2009), all found a U-shaped relationship between 
export concentration and GDP per capita by regressing the former on the 
latter. This can be interpreted as supporting the income-drives-export-
diversification conjecture, as the hypothetical reverse mapping, from 
diversification to income, would, in a certain range, assign two levels of 
income (a low one and a high one) to the same level of diversification. 
While multiple equilibria are common in economics, the rationale for this 
particular one would be difficult to understand. Feenstra and Kee (2008) 
were the first to test empirically the importance of the reverse mechanism—
from export diversification to productivity. They do so by estimating 
simultaneously a GDP function derived from a heterogeneous-firm model 
and a TFP equation where the number of export varieties (i.e. of exporting 
firms) is correlated with aggregate productivity through the usual selection 
effect. On a sample of 48 countries, they find that the doubling of product 
varieties observed over 1980-2000 explains a 3.3% cumulated increase in 
country-level TFP. Put differently, changes in export variety explain 1% of 
the variation in TFP across time and countries. The explanatory power of 
product variety is particularly weak in the between-country dimension 
(0.3%). Thus, product variety does not seem to explain much of the 
permanent TFP differences across countries, but an increase in export 
diversification—say, due to a decrease in tariffs—seems to trigger non-
negligeable selection effects. To recall, this selection effect means that the 
least efficient firms exit the domestic market when trade expands, raising 
the average productivity of remaining firms. Still, even in the within-
country dimension, two thirds of the variation in productivity is explained 
by factors other than trade expansion.  
4.2 Diversification, market access, and trade 
liberalization 
Returning to a formulation in which export diversification is on the left-
hand side, we now consider some of its non-income determinants. In a 
symmetric (representative-firm) monopolistic-competition model, the 
volume of trade, the number of exporting firms, and the number of varieties 
marketed are all proportional. In a heterogeneous-firms model, the 
relationship is more complex, but the ratio of export to domestic varieties is CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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also directly related to the ratio of export to domestic sales. Thus, it is no 
surprise that gravity determinants of trade volumes also affect the diversity 
of traded goods. For instance, Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola (2008) find 
that the distance and size of destination markets is related to the diversity 
of bilateral trade.  
Parteka and Tamberini (2008) apply a two-step estimation strategy to 
uncover some of the systematic (permanent) cross-country differences in 
export diversification. To do so, they break down country effects into a wide 
range of country-specific characteristics such as size, geographical 
conditions, endowments, human capital and institutional setting. Using a 
panel data-set for 60 countries and twenty years (1985-2004), they show 
that distance from major markets and country size are the most relevant 
and robust determinants of export diversity, once GDP per capita is 
controlled for. These results are consistent with those of Dutt et al. (2009), 
who show that distance to trading centers and market access (proxied by a 
host of bilateral and multilateral trading arrangement) are key 
determinants of diversification.  
Although preferential trade liberalization has received considerable 
attention in the empirical literature (e.g. Amurgo-Pachego, 2006, 
Gamberini, 2007, Feenstra and Kee 2007, or Dutt et al., 2009) as a driver of 
product diversification, unilateral trade reforms have not. Yet, we will see in 
Section 5 that the link between import diversification and TFP is strongly 
established at the firm level. Thus, import liberalization can be taken as a 
positive shock on TFP which should, according to the argument discussed 
in the previous section, raise the number of industries with an upper tail of 
firms capable of exporting—and thus overall export diversification. Indeed, 
arguments running roughly along this line can be found in Bernard, Jensen 
and Schott (2006) or in Broda, Greenfield, and Weinstein (2006), although 
the statistical linkage between trade liberalization and export diversity has CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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not been tested formally so far.4 This section presents a brief statistical 
analysis of this relation. 
To do so, we combine the Theil index of export concentration computed at 
the HS6 level by Cadot et al. (2009) for 1988-2006 with the trade 
liberalization date of Wacziarg and Welch (2008). The sample used 
includes 134 countries over 1988-2006, with 68% of country-year 
observations occurring in liberalized regimes (see annex Table A1). As Table 
1 shows, the conditional mean of Theil’s concentration index is 4.2 in a 







 Table 1  
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
                                                        
 
 
4 Using plant level panel data on Chilean manufacturers, Pavcnik (2002) evidences 
that the massive Chiliean trade liberalization of the 1970s has significantly 






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Theil 4.672 5.805 4.155 ***
Nber of obs. 2400 753 1647
Theil_within 3.596 4.149 3.373 ***
Nber of obs. 1864 535 1329
Theil_between 1.039 1.684 0.779 ***
Nber of obs. 1864 535 1329
Nber of products exported 2,235.5 1,219.4 2,700.0 ***a/
Nber of obs. 2400 753 1647
a/ H0: (2)=(3) versus Ha: (2)<(3)
Mean if trade 
liberalization




We then run fixed-effects regressions of the Theil index on a binary 
liberalization indicator defined by the dates of liberalization (equal to one 
when liberalized) to assess the within-country effect of trade liberalization 
on the diversification of exports. We use a difference-in-difference 
specification similar to the one used by Wacziarg and Welsh (2008): 
 Theilit = λi +δt +φLIBit + εit   (12) 
where  Theilit  is the Theil index of country i exports in year t,  LIBit  a 
dummy equals to 1 if t is greater than the year of liberalization (defined by 
Wacziarg and Welsh) and 0 otherwise. We introduce both country and year 
fixed-effects ( λi and  δt  respectively). The sample is not restricted to 
countries that underwent reforms.   
The regression for 1988-2006 shows a highly significant within-country 
difference in export diversification between a liberalized and a non-
liberalized regime (φ reported in CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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Table 2 column 1).  
We also regress equation (12) using the Theil index’s decomposition 
(within-groups vs. between-groups, see Section 2) and the number of 
exported products as the left-hand-side variable. Results are reported in CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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Table 2 columns (2)-(4). Controlling for country and year effects, it seems 
that countries that undertook trade liberalization reforms export more 
products and have a significant more diversified structure of exports along 
the extensive margin. By contrast, no significant difference in export 




Fixed-Effects Regressions of Diversification index on Liberalization Status 
Theil Theil-within Theil_between Nber 
Liberalization (LIB)  -0.366*** 0.011 -0.334*** 255.0***
(3.8) (0.1) (3.7) (3.0)
Number of Obs. 2400 1864 1864 2400
Number of countries  134 134 134 134
Period 1988-2006 1990-2004 1990-2004 1988-2006
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² within 0.31 0.26 0.62 0.66
Note: standard errors in parenthese, heteroscedasticity consistent and adjusted for country clustering; * p=0.1, ** 
p=0.05, ***:0.01  
 
Figure 2 shows the time path of export diversification for an average 
country before and after liberalization. The plain curve shows the Theil 
index (left-hand scale) and the dotted one shows the number of exported 
products at the HS6 level (right-hand scale) over a window of 10 years 
before and after liberalization. The sample is made of 95 countries that 
underwent permanent (non-reversed) liberalizations. A strong 
diversification trend (shrinking Theil index) is apparent over the entire 
post-liberalization windows, and particularly strong in the 5 years following 
it. The figure also suggests an anticipation effects in the three years 
preceding liberalization.  
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In order to further examine the timing of export diversification, we follow 
Wacziarg and Welsh (2008) and replace the LIB variable with five 
dummies, each capturing a two-year period immediately before and after 
the trade-liberalization date T. Coefficients on these dummies capture the 
average difference in the Theil index (and number of exported lines) 
between the period in question and a baseline period running from sample 
start to T-3.  
 
Table 3  
Fixed-Effects Regressions of Diversification index on Liberalization Timing 
Theil Nber 
Trade Liberalization in T
D1 [=1 if T-3≤t≤T-1] -0.059 (0.46) -123.0 (0.98)
D2 [=1 if T≤t≤T+2] -0.276* (1.67) 31.3 (0.21)
D3 [=1 if T+3≤t≤T+5] -0.464** (2.57) 216.6* (1.64)
D4 [=1 if T+6≤t≤T+8] -0.464** (2.27) 290.3* (1.67)
D5 [=1 if t>T+8] -0.610*** (2.67) 444.0** (2.23)
Number of Obs. 1715 1715
Number of countries  95 95
Period 1988-2006 1988-2006
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
R² within 0.37 0.72
Note: standard errors in parenthese, heteroscedasticity consistent and adjusted 
for country clustering; * p=0.1, ** p=0.05, ***:0.01  
 
Table 3 shows that the anticipation effect apparent in Figure 2 disappears in 
formal tests using the fixed-effects regression, i.e. in the presence of country 
and year effects. Diversification starts at the date of trade liberalization and 
proceeds steadily thereafter, as shown by the rising coefficients (in absolute 
value) on the period dummies. 
 
5. Export diversification and growth 
In this section, we move export diversification from the left-hand side to the 
right-hand side of the equation, i.e. from dependent to explanatory variable, 
but replacing the focus on productivity of the previous section by a focus on 
growth. Specifically, we will review the existing evidence on the 
relationship between initial diversification and subsequent growth, starting 
with a widely discussed hypothesis dubbed the “natural resource curse”. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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5.1 The “natural-resource curse” 
The central empirical findings behind the belief in a “natural resource 
curse” are the results of cross-sectional growth regressions in Sachs and 
Warner (1997) showing that a large share of natural-resource exports in 
GDP is statistically associated, ceteris paribus, with slow growth. Similar 
results can be found in the work of Auty (2000, 2001). There is no dearth of 
possible explanations for this negative correlation, but a good start is a set 
of arguments put forth by Prebisch (1959): deteriorating terms of trade, 
excess volatility, and low productivity growth. A host of other growth-
inhibiting syndromes associated with natural-resource economies are 
discussed in Gylfason (2008). Let us review the empirical support for each 
of these arguments in turn. 
The notion that the relative price of primary products has a downward 
trend is known as the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis. Verification of the 
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis was long hampered by a (suprising) lack of 
consistent price data for primary commodities, but Grilli and Yang (1988) 
constructed a reliable price index for 24 internationally traded commodities 
between 1900 and 1986. The index has later been updated by the IMF to 
1998. The relative price of commodities, calculated as the ratio of this index 
to manufacturing unit-value index, indeed showed a downward log-linear 
trend of -0.6% a year, confirming the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis. 
However, Cuddington, Ludema and Jayasuriya (2007) showed that the 
relative price of commodities has a unit root, so that the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis would be supported by a negative drift coefficient in a regression 
in first differences, not in levels (possibly allowing for a structural break in 
1921). But when the regression equation is first-differenced, there is no 
downward drift anymore. Thus, in their words, “[d]espite 50 years of 
empirical testing of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, a long-run downward 
trend in real commodity prices remains elusive.” (p. 134). 
The second argument in support of the natural resource curse has to do 
with the second moment of the price distribution. Easterly and Kray (2000) 
regressed income volatility on terms-of-trade volatility and dummy 
variables marking exporters of primary products. The dummy variables 
were significant contributors to income volatility over and above the 
volatility of the terms of trade. Jansen (2004) confirms those results with 
variables defined in a slightly different way. Combining these results with 
those of Ramey and Ramey (1995) who showed that income volatility is 
statistically associated with low growth suggests that the dominance of 
primary-product exports is a factor of growth-inhibiting volatility. 
Similarly, Collier and Gunning (1999), Dehn (2000) and Collier and Dehn 
(2001) found significant effects of commodity price shocks on growth.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
 
24 
However, these results must be nuanced. Using VAR models, Deaton and 
Miller (1996) and Raddatz (2007) showed that although external shocks 
have significant effects on the growth of low-income countries, together 
they can explain only a small part of the overall variance of their real per-
capita GDP. For instance, in Raddatz, changes in commodity prices account 
for a bit more than 4% of it, shocks in foreign aid about 3%, and climatic 
and humanitarian disasters about 1.5% each, leaving a whopping 89% to be 
explained. Raddatz’s interpretation is that the bulk of the instability is 
home-grown, through internal conflicts and economic mismanagement. 
Although this conclusion may be a bit quick (it is nothing more than a 
conjecture on a residual), together with those of Deaton and Miller, 
Raddatz’s results suggest that the effect of commodity-price volatility on 
growth suffers from a missing link: Although it is a statistically significant 
causal factor for GDP volatility and slow growth, it has not been shown yet 
to be quantitatively important. 
A third line of arguments runs as follows. Suppose that goods can be 
arranged along a spectrum of something that we may loosely think of as 
technological sophistication, quality, or productivity. Hausmann Hwang 
and Rodrik (2005) proxy this notion by an index they call PRODY, which is 
calculated as  
  PRODYk = ωkjYj j ∑   (13) 
where k stands for a good, j for a country, Yj  is country j’s GDP per capita, 
and  
  ωkj =
xkj xj










j ∑   (14) 
is a variant of Balassa’s index of revealed comparative advantage (in which 
xkj stands for country j’s exports of good k, xj  for country j’s total exports, 
xk for world exports of good k, and x for total world exports). They show 
that countries with a higher average initial PRODY (across their export 
portfolio) have subsequently stronger growth, suggesting, as they put it in 
the paper’s title, that « what you export matters ». As primary products 
typically figure in the laggards of the PRODY scale, diversifying out of them 
may accelerate subsequent growth. In addition, according to the so-called 
“Dutch disease” hypothesis (see references in Sachs and Warner 1997 or 
Arezki and van der Ploeg 2007) an expanding primary-product sector may 
well cannibalize other tradeable sectors through cost inflation and 
exchange-rate appreciation. Thus, natural resource might by themselves 
prevent the needed diversification out of them. Dutch-disease effects can, in CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
 
25 
turn, be aggravated by unsustainable policies like excessive borrowing 
(Manzano and Rigobon 2001 in fact argue that excessive borrowing is more 
of a cause for slow growth than natural resources—more on this below).  
However, Hausmann et al.’s empirical exercise must be interpreted with 
caution before jumping to the conclusion that public policy should aim at 
structural adjustment away from natural resources. Using a panel of 50 
countries between 1967 and 1992, Martin and Mitra (2006) found evidence 
of strong productivity (TFP) growth in agriculture—in fact, higher in many 
instances than that of manufacturing. For low-income countries, for 
instance, average TFP growth per year was 1.44% to 1.80% a year 
(depending on the production function’s functional form) against 0.22% to 
0.93% in manufacturing. Results were similar for other country groupings. 
Thus, a high share of agricultural products in GDP and exports is not 
necessarily, by itself (i.e. through a composition effect) a drag on growth.  
Other conjectures for why heavy dependence on primary products can 
inhibit growth emphasize bad governance and conflict. Tornell and Lane 
(1999), among many others, argued that deficient protection of property 
rights would lead, through a common-pool problem, to over-depletion of 
natural resources. Many others, referenced in Arezki and van der Ploeg 
(2007) and Gylfason (2008) put forward various political-economy 
mechanisms through which natural resources would interact with 
institutional deficiencies to hamper growth. In a series of papers, Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004, 2005) argued that natural resources can also provide a 
motive for armed rebellions and found, indeed, a statistical association 
between the importance of natural resources and the probability of internal 
conflicts.  
However, recent research has questioned not just the relevance of the 
channels through which natural-resource dependence is supposed to inhibit 
growth, but the very existence of a resource curse. The first blow came from 
Manzano and Rigobon (2001) who showed that once excess borrowing 
during booms is accounted for, the negative correlation between natural-
resource dependence and growth disappears. However, this could simply 
mean that natural-resource dependence breeds bad policies, which is not 
inconsistent with the natural-resource curse hypothesis.  
More recently, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) argued that measuring 
natural-resource dependence by either the share of primary products in 
total exports or that of primary-product exports in GDP makes it 
endogenous to bad policies and institutional breakdowns, and thus 
unsuitable as a regressor in a growth equation. To see why, assume that 
mining is an “activity of last resort”; that is, when institutions break down, 
manufacturing collapses but well-protected mining enclaves remain CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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relatively sheltered. Then, institutional breakdowns will mechanically result 
in a higher ratio of natural resources in exports (or natural-resource exports 
in GDP), while being also associated with lower subsequent growth. The 
correlation between natural-resource dependence and lower subsequent 
growth will then be spurious and certainly not reflect causation. In order to 
avoid omitted-variable bias, natural-resource dependence must be 
instrumented by a truly exogenous measure of natural-resource abundance. 
The stock of subsoil resources, on which the World Bank collected data for 
two years (1994 and 2000), provides just one such measure. But then 
instrumental-variable techniques yield no evidence of a resource curse; on 
the contrary, natural-resource abundance seems to bear a positive 
correlation with growth. Similarly, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) find 
no evidence of a correlation between natural-resource abundance and the 
probability of civil war.5 Thus, it is fair to say that at this stage the evidence 
in favor of a resource curse is far from clear-cut. 
5.2 A “concentration curse”? 
Notwithstanding the role of natural resources, it is possible that export 
concentration per se has a negative effect on subsequent growth. Lederman 
and Maloney (2007) found a robust negative association between the initial 
level of a Herfindahl index of export concentration and subsequent growth. 
Dutt, Mihov and van Zandt (2008) also found that export diversification 
correlates with subsequent GDP growth, especially if the initial pattern of 
export specialization is close to that of the US.  
The idea that all countries should strive to imitate the US export pattern as 
a recipe for growth sounds slightly far-fetched and would probably not fly 
very well as policy advice in developing countries. But there are additional 
difficulties with the notion of a “curse of concentration”. First, if there is 
one, we still don’t know why, as many of the arguments that could support 
                                                        
 
 
5 However, Arezki and van der Ploeg (2007) still found evidence of a resource curse 
for relatively closed economies when instrumenting for trade à la Frankel and 
Romer and for institutions à la Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson. The debate is 
thus not quite close. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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it were questioned in the debate on the natural-resource curse (e.g. the 
transmission of terms-of-trade volatility to income volatility). Second, we 
already saw in our discussion of Easterly, Reshef and Schwenkenberg 
(2009) in Section 2 that export concentration is a fact of life. More than 
that: As they argued, concentration may well be the result of success, when 
export growth is achieved by what they call a “big hit”. Costa Rica is an 
example. Thanks to good policies that make it an attractive production 
platform for multinationals, it was able to attract Intel in the late 1990s and 
became one of the world’s major exporters of micro-processors. But as a 
result, microprocessors now dwarf all the rest—including bananas—in Costa 
Rica’s exports, and concentration has gone up, not down.  
6. Another look at trade diversification: 
Imports 
Discussing trade diversification while overlooking that of imports would 
miss half the story.  Trade liberalization or facilitation has indeed entailed a 
large increase in imports diversification. Countries not only import more 
but they also import more varieties. Such diversification in imports has 
important implications for aggregate welfare, productivity, employment, 
and inequality. These are the focus of the next sections. 
6.1 Gains from diversity and “import competition” 
Krugman (1979)’s seminal paper was the first to show how countries gain 
from trade through imports of new varieties. Since then, most models of the 
new and new-new trade type encompass a “love-for-variety” element at the 
consumer and/or the producer level. However, empirical work assessing 
the gains from trade due to increased import diversification (i.e., an 
increase in the number of varieties imported) remains scarce, and the 
results point to modest gains. 
Broda and Weinstein (2006)’s paper stands as an exception. The paper 
provides evidence of the welfare gains due to growth in varieties imported. 
As is common in the literature, a variety is defined as the smallest product 
category available (seven- to ten-digit) and categories produced in different 
countries are seen as different varieties. The paper shows that, over the past 
tree decades years (1972–2001), the number of varieties (products × origin 
countries) imported by the U.S. has more than trebled while the share of 
imports in US GDP more than doubled. Roughly half of the increase in 
varieties is caused by an increase in the number of products, the other half 
resulting from an increase in origin countries.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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The authors find that consumers have a low elasticity of substitution across 
similar goods produced in different countries, yet at the same time the 
welfare gains due to increase product diversity seem small. Using their 
elasticities of substitution, they calculate an exact import-price index (one 
that accounts for the increase in varieties) and show that it is 28% lower 
than the conventionally measured one. This is large, but assuming an 
economic structure as in Krugman (1980), they show that consumers are 
willing to spend only 2.6% of their income to have access to these extra 
varieties; put differently, U.S.  welfare is 2.6 percent higher than otherwise 
due to the import of new varieties.  
Using Indian data, Goldberg et al. (2008) find that lower input tariffs 
reduced the conventional import price index of intermediate inputs by 
reducing the price of existing imported inputs, but also reduced the exact 
price index by adding new varieties; as a result, the exact price index is a 
modest 4.7% lower that the conventional one on average.  
A rise in diversification of import may also lead to productivity gains 
through “import competition”. As a country import new products from 
abroad, local producers of close substitute have to shape up in order to stay 
competitive. Productivity increase through this competitive effect but also 
though rationalization as less productive firms are forced to exit. For 
example, using Chilean data for 1979-1986, Pavcnik (2002) shows that 
following trade liberalization productivity of plants in the import competing 
sector increased by 3 to 10 % more than in other sector of the economy. She 
finds evidence of both an increase in productivity within plants and a 
reallocation of resources from the less to the most efficient producers. 
Other studies on developing countries include Levinsohn (1993) for Turkey, 
Harrison (1994) for Ivory Coast, Tybout and Westbrook (1995) for Mexico 
and Krishna, Mitra (1998) for India or Fernandes (2007) for Columbia. All 
these papers find a positive effect of increased import competition on 
domestic productivity. Trefler (2004) shows that Canadian plants labor 
productivity increased by 14% following the Canada-U.S. Free trade 
agreement. It also provides industry level evidence for those industries that 
experience the biggest decline in tariffs. Productivity increases by 15% (half 
of this coming from rationalization) while employment decreases by 12% 
(5% for manufacturing as a whole). This paper is one of the few to consider 
both the impact on productivity and on employment of lower tariffs trough 
more diversified imports. As stated in the paper, it points out the issue of 
adjustment costs which encompasses unemployment and displaced workers 
in the short run. It is worth mentioning that Trefler finds a rise in aggregate 
welfare.  
Another strand of literature focuses on gains from increasing varieties of 
imported inputs. In such case, most gain is measured in term of CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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productivity growth realized through lower input prices, access to higher 
quality of inputs and access to new technologies embodied in the imported 
varieties. Early models from Ethier (1982), Markusen (1989) or Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) provide such evidence. Increase import of input may 
also impact the labor market as varieties produced abroad may substitute 
for local labor or/and may require specific labor skills in order to be 
processed. The next sections provide empirical findings on these features, 
studying in turn the effect of increased import diversification on 
productivity, employment and inequalities. 
6.2 Imported inputs: productivity, employment 
and more. 
As evidence in Hummels et al. (2001), Yi (2003) or Strauss-Kahn (2004) 
the share of imported inputs in production has increase drastically over the 
past 30 years (e.g., Hummels et al. finds an increase of 40% between 1970 
and 1995). Amador and Cabral (2009) shows that this phenomenon is not 
specific to developed countries but also concerns developing countries such 
as Malaysia, Singapore or China. This recent pattern of trade reflects the 
increased ability of firms to “slice the value chain” and locate different 
stages of production in different countries thanks to reduced transportation 
and communication costs. Micro-level studies, as the one listed below, also 
provide evidence of such an increase in the use of imported intermediate 
good and henceforth of an increased diversification in imported inputs. For 
example, Goldberg et al. finds that imported inputs increased by 227% 
from1987 to 2000 in India while imported final goods rose by 90% over the 
period.  How does this increased diversification impact the domestic 
economy? Does it entail technological transfer and productivity growth? 
What is its impact on employment and exports? These are the questions we 
now address.  
How do intermediate goods affect productivity? Halpern at al. (2009) 
suggest two mechanisms: access to higher quality and better 
complementarity of inputs. The complementarity channel encompasses 
elements of gains from varieties and of learning spillovers between foreign 
and domestic goods. Variety gains come from imperfect substitution across 
goods, as in the love-of-variety setting of Krugman (1979) and Ethier (1982) 
and as evidence by Broda and Weinstein (2006). Technological spillovers 
occur as producers of final goods learn from the technology embodied in 
the intermediate goods through careful study of the imported product (the 
blueprint) (Keller (2004)).  
Several studies have analyzed the effect of an increase in imported inputs 
on productivity. Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al. (1997) find that CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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foreign knowledge embodied in imported inputs from countries with larger 
R&D stocks has a positive effect on aggregate total factor productivity. 
Keller (2002) shows that trade in differentiated intermediate goods is a 
significant channel of technology diffusion. He finds that about 20% of the 
productivity of a domestic industry can be attributed to foreign R&D, 
accessed through imports of intermediate goods. Using plant level data for 
Indonesia for 1991 to 2001, Amiti and Konings (2007) disentangle the 
impact of a fall in tariff on output from a fall in tariff on inputs. They find 
that a decrease in inputs tariffs of 10 percentage point increases 
productivity by 12% in importing firms whereas non-importing firms 
benefit only by 3% suggesting productivity gains through technology effect 
embodied in the imported inputs rather than trough import price effect. 6 
Similarly, Kasahara, and Rodrigue (2008) uses Chilean manufacturing 
plants data from 1979 to 1996 and find a positive and immediate impact of 
increased use of imported inputs on importers productivity. They also 
provide some evidence of learning by importing (i.e., past import positively 
impact current productivity). Muendler (2004) does not find however a 
substantial impact of increased use of imported inputs on productivity for 
Brazil in the early 1990s. Loof, H. and M. Anderson (2008) uses a database 
of Swedish manufacturing firms over an eight-year period (1997-2204) and 
finds that the distribution of imports across different origin countries 
matters (i.e., productivity is increasing in the G7-fraction of total import). 
By and large, empirical studies thus evidence that diversification of 
imported inputs increases the productivity of domestic firms.  
As mentioned above this increase in productivity may occur through several 
channels: increased quality and/or complementarity. Very few papers to 
date analyze the relative contribution of these mechanisms. A notable 
exception is Halpern at al. (2009). The authors use a panel of Hungarian 
firms from 1992 to 2003 to examine the quality and variety channel 
(imported inputs are assumed imperfect substitutes to domestic inputs), 
                                                        
 
 
6 Interestingly, the effect of a decrease in input tariffs is much larger (more than 
twice as large) than the one found with a decrease in output tariffs. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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through which imports can affect firm productivity. 7 They find that imports 
lead to significant productivity gains, of which two thirds are attributed to 
the complementarity argument and the remainder to the quality argument. 
Obviously, these two mechanisms have different implications on the 
economy. When quality is important, an increase in imported inputs entails 
large import substitution, hurting domestic intermediate good producers 
and thereby employment. By contrast, when complementarities matter, an 
increase in imported inputs affects the demand for domestic goods much 
less, because they must be combined with foreign goods to maximize 
output. Thus employment is barely impacted. 
Diversification in imports of intermediate goods may also affect the number 
of good produced domestically (diversification in production) and exported 
(diversification in exports). Kasahara and Lapham (2006) extend Melitz 
model to incorporate imported intermediate goods. In their model, 
productivity gains from importing intermediates (through the increasing 
returns to variety in production) may allow some importers to start 
exporting. Importantly, because import and export are complementary, 
import protection acts as export destruction. Goldberg et al. (2008) shows 
that imports of new varieties of inputs lead to a substantial increase in the 
number of domestic varieties produced. The paper provides evidence that 
the growth in product scope results from the access to new varieties of 
imported inputs rather than the decrease in the import price index for 
intermediate products.  
The literature thus provides strong evidence that an increase in the import 
of intermediate goods boosts productivity. This growth in productivity is a 
direct consequence of the rise in the number of varieties of imported inputs 
trough the channels of a better complementarity with domestic varieties 
and of learning effect of foreign technology. The increase diversification in 
imported inputs also entails an increase in the number of domestic varieties 
produced and exported. It therefore impacts greatly the economic activity. 
Concerning the effect of increase diversification on employment, the 
                                                        
 
 
7 Their model includes a term related to the number of intermediate imported 
goods in the production function which reflects the complementarity channel. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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evidence is scarce. As far as we know, no study analyzes the impact of 
imported inputs diversification on the labor market. Productivity in most 
studies is measure as total factor productivity and is therefore X-neutral (no 
impact on employment). Moreover, if domestic and foreign intermediate 
goods are not perfectly substitute, as shown in several studies, higher 
diversification of imported inputs should not affect the aggregate level of 
employment.  
6.3 Skilled labor and absorptive capacities  
It is however likely that the benefit of higher productivity accrue to the 
countries/industries which present a significant level of absorptive 
capacities. Human capital and spending in R&D stands out as the main 
absorptive capacities in term of adoption and integration of foreign 
technologies into domestic production process (see Keller (2004) or Eaton 
and Kortum (1996) for early work on the topic). Using a database of 22 
manufacturing industries in 17 countries for the 1973-2002 period, Acharya 
and Keller (2007) shows that import is a major channel of international 
technology transfer and finds that some countries benefit more from 
foreign technology than others. As asserted by the authors, such finding 
suggests an important difference in absorptive capacity. On the same token, 
Serti and Tomasi (2008) finds than importers sourcing from developed 
countries are more capital and skilled intensive than firms buying only from 
developing countries. This may reflect the importance of absorptive 
capacities or may be a consequence of “learning by importing”.  
One important paper on the topic is Augier et al. (2009). This paper not 
only evaluates the impact of increased imports on firms’ productivity but it 
also explores the importance of firms absorptive capacity in firms abilities 
to capture technologies embodied in foreign imports. Importantly, the 
paper considers imported inputs but also imports in capital equipment 
which represents another channel through which technology may spill. 
Augier et al. (2009) uses a panel of Spanish firm from 1991 to 2002 which 
includes information on the proportion of skilled labor per firms. As 
mentioned above, such variables may proxy for absorptive capacities. Firms 
with a share of skilled labor 10% above the average experience a 
productivity gain of 9 percentage points in the first two years after they 
start importing and of 7 percentage points in the following year. As these 
results are much higher than the one found with lower skilled-labor-
intensive firms, firms heterogeneity in absorptive capacities seems to affect 
greatly the contribution of imported input and equipment in increasing 
productivity. 
Although more research exploring the role of absorptive capacity in 
capturing technology embodied in new imported varieties is needed CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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(looking for example at the role of R&D spending, the quality of 
infrastructures or institutions), there exist some evidence that skilled labor 
is a necessary requirement for technology transfer. The positive impact of 
the diversification of imports seems hence conditional on the absorptive 
capacities of a country or industry.   
6.4 Increased import diversification in 
intermediate inputs as a substitute to unskilled 
labor? 
Finally, the increase in imported inputs may have an impact on inequalities 
between skilled and unskilled workers if it reflects a substitution of 
domestic labor by foreign labor for cost purposes. A domestic firm may 
indeed find profitable to source inputs internationally instead of producing 
them locally. A first wave of studies considering this issue focused on 
manufacturing firms. It includes Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) for the 
US, Egger and Egger (2003) for Austria, Hijzen, et al. (2005) for the UK or 
Strauss-Kahn (2004) for France. These papers investigate the impact of an 
increase in imported inputs on relative demand and/or wage differentials 
between skilled and unskilled workers. All papers on the topic evidence that 
international sourcing has a major and significant impact on relative wage 
or/and employment. Authors find that the growth in imported inputs 
accounts form 11% to 30% of the observed increase in inequality across skill 
groups.   
More recent literature on the issue focuses on the sourcing of services. A 
new feature of international trade is indeed the increase in the size and 
varieties of services traded. For example, Amiti and Wei (2006) shows that 
imported service inputs from U.S. manufacturing firms has grown at a 
annual rate of 6% over the 1992-2000 period. Amiti and Wei (2006) for the 
U.S. as well as Amiti and Wei (2005) for the U.K. find little evidence of the 
impact of the rise in service imports on employment. It could be argue 
however that (i) their measure of employment is too broad as sourcing in 
services may affect the less skilled workers among the skilled and (ii) in 
countries with relatively flexible labor markets as the U.K. and the U.S. the 
main effect should be observe trough changes in factor prices (i.e., wages) 
rather than employment. Geishecker and Gorg (2008) uses household level 
panel data combined with industry level data on imported services inputs 
for the 1992-2004 period. The paper can therefore analyze the effect of the 
growth in imported service inputs on individual worker wages. They find 
that the real wage of the low and medium skilled workers decrease while the 
real wage of the most skilled increases. Thus increased diversification in 
service imports leads to an increase in inequality between workers in 
different skill groups. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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7.  Conclusions and policy implications 
One would wish that the enormous amount of attention that export 
diversification has attracted, both theoretically and empirically, would 
naturally lead to robust policy prescriptions, for which developing countries 
are hungry. Unfortunately, how best to achieve export diversification, and 
how it should rank in the list of government priorities, are still very much 
open questions—part of a wider debate on the usefulness of industrial 
policy. 
In spite of the many open questions, a few remarks emerge from the 
literature as it stands today. First, however many demands trade experts get 
from governments on helping to pick winners, the literature has very little 
to say about that. For one thing, some of the winners are products that 
today simply do not exist. Even the savviest experts would find it difficult to 
give governments a road map for entering markets that don’t exist.  
Second, the export-diversification literature has focused largely on the what 
is produced rather than on the how it is produced. Yet Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti (2000) developed a model highlighting differences in production 
methods, themselves driven by differences in the availability of skilled 
labor. Their work highlights that technologies developed in the North are 
typically tailored to the needs of a skilled workforce and therefore 
inappropriate for skill-scarce countries. This implies that policy advice 
based on reasoning à la Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (export what rich 
countries export, and you will become rich) may be simply missing a 
traditional determinant of trade patterns—factor endowments. If countries 
do not have the capabilities to master the tacit knowledge needed to 
produce sophisticated goods, no industrial policy will make them successful 
exporters. The only sensible policies are then supply-side ones, like the one 
India followed for years when it gradually built a world-class network of 
technology institutes.  
Third, as Easterly et al. (2009) show, the probability of a big hit decreases 
exponentially with its size, making “picking winners” a lottery game. What 
industrial planner would have dreamt of advising the Egyptian government 
to aggressively target the Italian market for “ceramic bathroom kitchen 
sanitary items, not porcelain”? We know very little about the channels by 
which some producers of that stuff got informed of the market 
opportunities. Who is well positioned, of the market or government, to 
identify potential “big hits”? One traditional argument in favor of industrial 
policy is that the government is better placed than the market to overcome 
market failures (say in the search for information). But the market 
compensates for this by its ability to generate an endless stream of 
gamblers, each trying his luck in a particular niche. Besedes and Prusa’s CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.31 
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work (see e.g. Besedes and Prusa 2008 and references therein) shows the 
importance of this trial-and-error process by the very low survival rate of 
export spells (periods of uninterrupted exports in one product between two 
countries). This costly search is probably best left to the market which can 
provide an endless stream of adventurers. However, the argument cuts both 
ways. On one hand, the market generates a very active export-
entrepreneurship activity (especially in low-income countries) that is likely 
to produce, one day or another, a hit; on the other hand, much of the 
criticism against government policy implicitly assumes that it should 
succeed all the time. Many industrial-policy failures may be necessary 
before one public project succeeds, just like for private investors, and a 
valid critique of government “picking winners” should not just count how 
many projects failed; it should show that success is not possible, or that the 
search process is inefficient.  
As a last remark, although one aim of the export-diversification literature is, 
ultimately, to generate useful policy advice for developing countries, it 
sweeps under the carpet an important historical regularity. Practically all 
latecomers in the industrial revolution, in particular the big ones—France in 
the early XIXth century, Japan under the Meiji, Germany at the turn of the 
XXth century, China today, to name but a few—have been aggressive 
imitators of the technology of more advanced economic powers. All those 
countries expanded their basket of exports by plundering technology, 
sometimes (often) with government assistance and with little regard for 
intellectual property. This process was badly received in advanced 
countries, but it was a major driver in the diffusion of the Industrial 
Revolution. We don’t know much about the policies that were put in place 
in the catching-up countries, and the literature has been largely silent on 
this. No wonder: intellectual-property enforcement is now widely taken as 
one of the basic good-governance prerequisites for development, and 
encroachments on the intellectual property of advanced countries are now 
fought more vigorously than ever before. But for countries that were 
yesterday’s imitators, this might well be a modern version of List’s famous 
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Countries (134)




index           
(1988-2006) Countries (134)




index           
(1988-2006)
Angola closed 8.18 Ecuador 1991 6.02
Albania 1992 4.60 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1995 4.69
Argentina 1991 3.58 Spain 1959 2.13
Armenia 1995 5.43 Estonia closed 3.24
Australia 1964 3.60 Ethiopia 1996 6.33
Austria 1960 1.88 Finland 1960 3.00
Azerbaijan 1995 6.28 France 1959 1.95
Burundi 1999 7.36 Gabon closed 7.56
Belgium 1959 2.20 United Kingdom Always 2.15
Benin 1990 6.90 Georgia 1996 4.74
Burkina Faso 1998 6.87 Ghana 1985 5.73
Bangladesh 1996 4.68 Guinea 1986 6.97
Bulgaria 1991 2.76 Gambia, The 1985 6.26
Belarus closed 4.01 Guinea-Bissau 1987 6.98
Bolivia 1985 5.21 Greece 1959 2.89
Brazil 1991 3.11 Guatemala 1988 4.45
Botswana 1979 7.34 Guyana 1988 6.10
Central African Republic closed 6.66 Hong Kong, China Always 2.56
Canada 1952 3.15 Honduras 1991 4.84
Switzerland Always 2.32 Croatia closed 2.74
Chile 1976 4.57 Haiti closed 5.08
China closed 2.17 Hungary 1990 2.55
Cote d'Ivoire 1994 5.63 Indonesia 1970 3.71
Cameroon 1993 6.22 India closed 2.98
Congo, Rep. closed 7.45 Ireland 1966 3.63
Colombia 1986 4.88 Iran, Islamic Rep. closed 7.45
Cape Verde 1991 5.77 Iceland closed 5.12
Costa Rica 1986 4.97 Israel 1985 3.78
Cyprus 1960 3.71 Italy 1959 1.56
Czech Republic 1991 2.04 Jamaica 1989 5.92
Germany 1959 1.71 Jordan 1965 4.85
Denmark 1959 2.22 Japan 1964 2.47
Dominican Republic 1992 4.65 Kazakhstan closed 5.16
Algeria closed 6.98 Kenya 1993 4.73  
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Table A1 (cont’d) 
 
Countries (134)




index           
(1988-2006) Countries (134)




index           
(1988-2006)
Kyrgyz Republic 1994 4.81 Paraguay 1989 5.70
Korea, Rep. 1968 2.71 Romania 1992 2.93
Liberia closed 6.72 Russian Ferderation closed 4.34
Sri Lanka 1991 3.58 Rwanda closed 7.26
Lesotho closed 6.10 Senegal closed 5.07
Lituania 1993 3.37 Singapore 1965 3.66
Luxembourg 1959 3.20 Sierra Leone 2001 5.98
Latvia 1993 3.99 El Salvador 1989 4.72
Morocco 1984 3.82 Slovak Republic 1991 2.67
Moldova 1994 4.08 Slovenia 1991 2.39
Madagascar 1996 5.11 Sweden 1960 2.39
Mexico 1986 3.51 Swaziland closed 4.64
Macedonia, FYR 1994 3.43 Syrian Arab Republic closed 6.57
Mali 1988 7.22 Chad closed 7.83
Mozambique 1995 5.74 Togo closed 6.00
Mauritania 1995 6.73 Thailand Always 2.91
Mauritius 1968 4.93 Tajikistan 1996 6.29
Malawi closed 6.68 Turkmenistan closed 7.23
Malaysia 1963 3.64 Trinidad and Tobago 1992 5.72
Niger 1994 6.64 Tunisia 1989 3.83
Nigeria closed 7.99 Turkey 1989 2.73
Nicaragua 1991 5.20 Tanzania 1995 5.09
Netherlands 1959 2.00 Uganda 1988 6.74
Norway Always 4.60 Ukraine closed 3.16
Nepal 1991 5.27 Uruguay 1990 3.73
New Zealand 1986 3.26 United States Always 1.97
Pakistan 2001 3.81 Uzbekistan closed 5.98
Panama 1996 4.25 Venezuela 1996 6.27
Peru 1991 4.60 Yemen, Rep. Always 7.91
Philippines 1988 4.06 South Africa 1991 3.41
Papua New Guinea closed 6.33 Congo, Dem. Rep. closed 6.43
Poland 1990 2.36 Zambia 1993 6.58
Portugal Always 2.73 Zimbabwe closed 4.80
   